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Abstract
To secure funding for a project, an agent (informed about the project’s type) announces
a target output. The principal provides more generous resources for high targets but makes
compensation tied to performance relative to the projection. The incentive mechanism is
geared towards screening project/agent types for resource disbursement at the ex-ante stage
and motivating appropriate efforts at the interim stage. These dual objectives are embedded
in an optimal share contract solution: a pair of startup funds and output share between the
principal and agent. The target mechanism’s performance is then assessed with respect to
implementation of the optimal share contract solution. The focus is on linear contracts for
their applicability and practical relevance.
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1 Introduction
A standard procedure in many organizations involves employees submitting performance tar-
gets. For capital investment projects, managers are required to make projections of revenue
streams. Within firms, departments competing for higher budgets may make projections of ad-
ditional revenue generation. Semi-governmental credit cooperatives may give subsidized credit
to individuals for projects without collateral or any history of past performance, but they may
still try to unravel any project’s true potential by requiring varied repayment terms based on
requested amount of loans and actual performance. Small-to-medium size entrepreneurs are
required to submit business proposals for funding from banks or venture capitalists or business
angels. In share tenancy in agriculture, a tenant may indicate anticipated crop produce for an
absentee landlord’s decision regarding the supply of fertilizers or other forms of capital support.
Public and private organizations (for example, universities) often require researchers to specify
intended outcomes to secure funding for R&D projects.
In all the above applications, the principal (employer, lender or landlord) commits valuable
resources into a project whose productivity depends on both the quality of the project (same as
the agent’s type in our formulation) and the effort of the agent managing the resources. If the
project’s (or agent’s) quality cannot be observed and the agent’s effort cannot be monitored,
the final output offers only a crude performance measure solely on which to base the incentives.
The question of resources (capital/funding/loans as discussed above) is an ex-ante decision,
so project screening is essential. Simultaneously, inducing the agent to exert effort at the
interim stage (following resource provision) is a standard incentive problem. How can these
dual objectives be aligned? With this being the primary concern, we analyze the performance
of a target-based incentive mechanism.
In terms of analysis, we focus on what we consider to be a plausible implementation objective
for the principal: the optimal share contract, which belongs to the special but important class
of contracts, affine/linear contracts. The optimal share contract solution is defined in terms of
the resources the agent should receive and a split of output between the principal and the agent,
depending on project’s type. We also derive the unrestricted second-best contract. However, our
focus on linear, rather than optimal, contracts is motivated by the former’s practical relevance
and easy applicability. See Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999), Lafontaine and Slade (2000)
and Chiappori and Salanie (2003) for evidence on the prevalence of fairly simple contracts in
the real world.
The core of our analysis concerns implementation of the optimal share contract solution
using target incentives that are piecewise-linear in output and the shortfall of output from the
agent’s projected target.1 We ask whether such a mechanism can efficiently screen a project’s
type allowing the principal to channel initial capital according to the project’s potential. The
mechanism we employ involves only a “small” reduction in the agent’s reward for a “small
shortfall”. It is well-known in the mechanism design/agency literature that, with large penalties,
agent misbehavior can be controlled but these may not be very practical solutions. Achieving
1McAfee and McMillan (1986) and Laffont and Tirole (1986) studied similar linear contracts for incentive
provision.
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desirable agent behavior with continuous (rather than large, discrete) adjustment in incentives
should be part of an ideal mechanism design objective. Moreover, although issues of fairness and
inequity aversion cannot be captured in our model, human attitude toward punishment tends
to be of a compassionate nature; see, among others, Charness (2004) and Fehr et al. (2007)
in the context of experiments involving moral hazard problems. Taking a similar view, any
reasonable suggestion for performance improvement must not push the accountability doctrine
too far; a proportionate reduction in salary for underperformance is going to be less contentious.
While we focus on proportionate reward adjustments, we also demonstrate the potency of target
mechanisms when discrete/lump-sum adjustments are feasible.
Our findings are as follows. When output is deterministic, using the target mechanism, there
is proper disbursement of resources and the optimal share contract is implemented (Proposition
1). In the stochastic case, the high-ability agent can always be induced to announce a high
target and produce output equal to the high type’s optimal share contract level with observable
types (Proposition 4). Whether the low-ability agent (truthfully) declares a low target or high
target might depend on the random component of output. For large random components, a
target contract may not always induce a low-type agent’s self-selection of targets. However,
if the random component is sufficiently small on average, the target contract ensures costless
resolution of the adverse selection problem along with channeling of resources according to agent
types (Proposition 5). Further, if we allow for discrete adjustments in the agent’s reward (to
be made clear later in the paper), the target contract performs reasonably well even for non-
negligible random output component (Proposition 6). Overall, our results suggest a positive
role of targets for screening of agent types and more efficient disbursement of resources, even
beyond the class of linear contracts.
In general, resource provision by the principal implies that there is more on the line for the
principal due to the resource cost. The agent tries to manoeuver the principal towards providing
higher resources, who responds by using a richer contract space – output and resource contingent
reward. This gives more leverage to the principal. Overall, the principal faces a more challenging
task – to steer the agent towards appropriate resource support and effort. One might expect
that the principal’s share would increase with the resources she provides. However, overcoming
the information asymmetry about agent/project type requires the principle to accept output
shares that do not necessarily increase (and may possibly decrease) with the resources she
provides. This is essentially due to the information rent that accrues to the high-ability agent
who is provided higher resource support. It should be of interest that the target mechanism,
using small proportionate reward adjustments, can properly disburse resources and overcome
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
In the next section, we discuss the related literature. Section 3 presents the optimal share
contract solution for a deterministic production technology. In section 4, we introduce the
target contract. Section 5 generalizes the target contract to the case of production uncertainty.
Section 6 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 Related literature
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) provides an overview of the issues explored in the contract
theory literature, which is too vast to be adequately reviewed here. We discuss closely related
papers here. Using the principal-agent framework, the contract theory literature has earlier
explored the role of targets in incentive provision in the presence of both adverse selection
and moral hazard (for instance, Laffont and Tirole (1986), McAfee and McMillan (1986), Zou
(1992)). McAfee and McMillan (1986) consider a cost overrun linear contract in a model of
bidding for government contracts. If the realized cost exceeds the winning firm’s bid, the firm
is responsible for a fraction of the cost overrun, while if the cost is below the bid the firm
keeps a part of the cost savings. Laffont and Tirole (1986) also studied a similar incentive
contract involving cost overruns. In their model, a supplier has private information about a
project’s cost and can invest in cost reduction. The supplier announces expected costs and the
optimal contract is linear in cost overruns. Zou (1992) studies a principal-agent production
setting with moral hazard and the agent’s ‘type’ affecting the disutility of effort. He shows
that a threat-based incentive mechanism allowing the agent to select the levels of an exogenous
lump-sum penalty and a corresponding minimal target output would eliminate moral hazard
but the principal must concede information rent to the agent. The role of targets in pure moral
hazard settings has been analyzed by Liu (1986) and Osband (1987). They find that if extremely
severe penalties are imposed by the principal for output falling below a threshold target level,
the penalty is almost never imposed ex-post.
Among recent works, Gershkov and Perry (2012) consider a dynamic principal-agent model
with both moral hazard and adverse selection where an agent, whose type (high or low) is not
known to the principal faces a sequence of tasks that are either easy or difficult (known only
to the agent). To induce only the high quality agent to take up the difficult task, the principal
should reward the agent only if the agent succeeds over a minimal number of successive tasks.
The dynamic structure helps the principal to match high-quality agents with difficult tasks.
The minimal sustained performance requirement in Gershkov and Perry (2012) is similar to the
trigger of a target performance in our static setting.
What is missing from the above literature (both the static contracting literature and the
dynamic version as in Gershkov and Perry (2012)) is an analysis of resource provision by the
principal. In the applications discussed in the Introduction, the principal needs to supply the
“seed” fund for a project to be viable and would like to choose an amount according to the
project’s merit.
Empirical evidence suggests that contracts used in practice are often not the optimal con-
tracts predicted in theory – see, for instance, Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999), and La-
fontaine and Slade (2000). Further, Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Chiappori and Salanie
(2003) highlight the prevalence of fairly simple contracts in the real world. More importantly,
share contracts come as natural consideration in partnerships, and are frequently observed in
corporate and agricultural settings. For instance, sales contracts and sharecropping in agri-
culture are usually on a percentage basis. In agriculture, Laffont and Matoussi (1995) have
highlighted the importance of share contract among the three main categories of contracts
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(rental contract and wage contract being the other two); for other studies see Bardhan and
Srinivasan (1971), Hallagan (1978), Braverman and Stiglitz (1982), Allen (1982), Basu (1992),
and more recently de Janvry and Sadoulet (2007) and Sen (2011). Executive pay packages often
include stock options conditional on a threshold performance (Murphy (1999)). Profit sharing
or equity participation is also considered to be a reasonable way to align employer-employee
objectives (Weitzman (1985), Blanchflower and Oswald (1987), Grout (1988), Raith (2008)).
These papers indicate the practical relevance and wide applicability of share contracts; hence,
our focus on this class of linear contracts.
3 The model
A principal hires an agent to produce output that is a function of the agent’s effort, the agent’s
(or the specific project’s) type (productivity) and some key input (resource) the principal sup-
plies. A contract between the principal and the agent is a sharing rule defined in terms of output
and a target of achievement chosen by the agent. The principal does not observe the agent’s
effort (moral hazard problem) nor knows the agent’s productivity (adverse selection problem).
How much resource the principal allocates to the agent to facilitate production should ideally
depend on the agent’s type, but due to lack of information about the agent’s type, the principal
may allocate resources that are either too high or too low (resource allocation problem). The
use of targets is primarily intended to solve this information problem.
The production function is of the Cobb-Douglas family:
y = ωηατe, with η ∈ (0, 1
2
), (1)
where ω is the resource provided by the principal for the project, ατ is the agent’s marginal
productivity parameter, and e is the agent’s effort. The restriction η < 1/2 is to make the
resource allocation problem interesting. Later, we will see that if η ≥ 1/2, there will be non-
decreasing returns to resources and the principal would like to supply an unbounded amount of
resources to the agent irrespective of the agent’s type; see, also, footnote 6. In that case, the
resource allocation is determined by the limit on the resources that the principal has access to.
Then, the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection take a back seat. We assume that
the resource given is specific to the project and cannot be “stolen” by the agent for personal
consumption. The agent is one of two possible types, τ ∈ {h, `}, with ατ ∈ {α`, αh}, where
0 < α` < αh; ατ = αh (i.e., the agent is of a ‘high’ type) with probability p and ατ = α` (the
agent is a ‘low’ type) with probability 1− p.
The agent’s utility is separable in income and effort, U = R(y) − 12e2, where R(y) is the
compensation from the principal. As is standard, we assume that the cost of effort is increasing
and strictly convex.2 The agent is risk-neutral in income and faces limited liability ; the latter
requires R(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ≥ 0. The principal is risk-neutral and her payoff is V = y −R(y)− ω.3
2Similar quadratic effort cost formulations are used in Osband (1987), Prendergast (1999) and Raith (2008),
among others.
3Note that all accounting is done in equivalent real terms; see, for instance, Raith (2008).
4
Lemma 1. The first-best outcome involves the following type-contingent
(i) resources: ωfb,τ = (ηα
2
τ )
1
1−2η ,
(ii) agent effort: efb,τ = (ατη
η)
1
1−2η , and
(iii) output: yfb,τ = (ατη
η)
2
1−2η = e2fb,τ .
The subscript fb denotes the first-best solutions. The proof appears in the Appendix.
We are going to focus on general affine contracts of the form R(y) = T + δy where T R 0.
One can consider setting T < 0 so that the agent makes a fixed transfer to the principal –
a surplus extraction device. If, in addition, δ = 0, this would imply the principal selling the
project to the risk-neutral agent. However, given that the principal has to finance the project
in the first place, asking for a fixed positive payment from the agent when there might even
be zero output would be a contradiction. Also, such contracts cannot be implemented due to
the limited liability constraint. On the other hand, setting T > 0 is not necessary in our setup
as any value the principal can obtain with this contractual form under full information can be
improved upon using a pure share contract. Hence, we restrict our attention to T = 0 and our
emphasis will be on share contracts of the form:
R(y) = δy, 0 < δ < 1. (2)
Share contracts, part of a family of affine contracts, are simple and widely practised in various
production settings as discussed in section 1.
Optimal share contract. We will propose an incentive mechanism to tackle the adverse
selection problem. Specifically, we set out our objective to implement the optimal share contract,
i.e., the share contract that maximizes the principal’s payoff under the “as if” presumption that
the principal knows the agent’s type. In this context it may be noted that, even if the principal
may not directly observe the agent’s effort, for deterministic production as in (1), the effort
exerted by the agent can be precisely inferred from the output and, thus, moral hazard is not
really an issue.4 It is straightforward to construct a mechanism implementing first-best (type
contingent) effort levels and extracting full surplus for the principal.5
Given resources, ω, and a share contract as specified in (2), the agent solves:
max
e≥0
U = δωηατe− 1
2
e2,
to determine her effort level (that depends on the agent’s type and the resources provided by
the principal) as follows (note that ∂
2U
∂e2
= −1 < 0):
eτ = δω
ηατ , τ = `, h. (3)
4Laffont and Martimort (2002) call this is a ‘false moral hazard’ problem.
5In fact this is true even when there could be noise due to the presence of a stochastic term in production so
long as there exists output levels that reveal with probability arbitrarily close to 1 that the agent defected from
a prescribed effort (see Remark 1 in section B1.3 of Ch. 1 of Laffont and Tirole (1993)). However, the penalty
for deviations will have to be lump-sum.
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The principal chooses δ and ω to maximize her surplus, V = (1− δ)y−ω, given the agent’s
optimal effort choice. Using eτ in (3), rewrite the principal’s problem as:
max
δ,ω
V = δ(1− δ)α2τω2η − ω,
solving which, using the first-order conditions, yields:6
ωsc,τ =
[
2ηδsc(1− δsc)α2τ
] 1
1−2η (4)
and, δsc,τ = δsc =
1
2
, (5)
where subscript, sc, refers to optimal share contract. This leads to:
ysc,τ = δsc(ωsc,τ )
2ηα2τ , τ = `, h. (6)
We refer to (ωsc,τ , δsc,τ ) as the optimal share contract solution, given observable agent types.
We are interested in using target based incentives to implement this solution when the agent’s
type is unknown to the principal.
4 Target announcements under adverse selection
Henceforth, we assume that the agent’s type is unknown to the principal and analyze how
target projections can resolve this information asymmetry. We consider a modification to the
share contract: suppose that before allocating resources (ω), the principal requires the agent to
announce a target output, yˆ. Then, given the resources (that depend on the projected target),
the actual output and the announced target, the agent’s reward is determined as follows:
[Target contract]
If yˆ < ysc,h : ω = ωsc,`, R = δscy ;
If yˆ ≥ ysc,h : ω = ωsc,h, R =

δscy if y ≥ ysc,h ,
δscy −min{(1− δsc)[ysc,h − y], δscy}︸ ︷︷ ︸
reward adjustment
if y < ysc,h ;
(7)
where y is the realized output, and ysc,h is the output under the optimal share contract for the
high-type agent as determined in (6). ||
It is worth elaborating on the nature of the contract. The principal, in keeping with the
optimal share contract solution with known types, offers a more generous resource support,
ωsc,h, when the projected target is high, at least ysc,h, and a moderate support for targets below
6The second-order conditions are also satisfied: ∂
2V
∂ω2
= 2η(2η − 1)δ(1 − δ)α2τω2η−2 < 0, if (and only if)
η ∈ (0, 1
2
); ∂
2V
∂δ2
= −2α2τω2η < 0; ∂2V∂ω2 ∂
2V
∂δ2
− ( ∂2V
∂ω∂δ
)
2
= η(1− 2η)α4τω4η−2sc,τ > 0 (using δsc = 12 ).
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Fig. 1a: Agent’s share with projection of a high target 
 
Fig. 1b: Principal’s share when agent projects high target 
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this threshold.7 Without the target announcement, a linear contract cannot separate between
agent types and, thus, the principal has to offer a pooling contract by awarding resources for an
average-type agent, which would result in a lower surplus for the principal.8 Also, for proper
disbursement of the more generous support, the principal adjusts the agent’s reward if the
latter underperforms after announcing a high target. Note, however, that this adjustment is
kept within reasonable bounds. First, the agent is not asked to compensate the principal in
excess of the amount of the loss in the latter’s share due to underperformance. And, even then,
the agent is never asked for compensation that is more than what would have been her share of
output, δscy, thus satisfying the limited liability constraint. That is, when the agent announces
a high target and fails to meet the target, her status is one of residual claimant. In this case,
the agent’s reward in (7) can be written as R = max{0, y − (1− δsc)ysc,h}, which implies that,
for output realization lower than ysc,h, the agent receives a cut in her share, while for output
realization higher than ysc,h, the optimal shares are respected. This prioritization is to prevent
the agent from projecting excessive targets to receive high resource support from the principal.
The contract is presented in Figs. 1a-b. These figures are also going to be applicable to our
analysis in section 4. For now, one should treat δ˜sc,h = δsc and y¯ = ysc,h.
Relevance of target contracts. For practical relevance of target incentives, Fig. 1a
7Alternatively, the principal could require the agent to announce resource support needed. Of course, there
would be appropriate changes to the contract offered: for instance, if an agent asks for resources ωˆ ≥ ωsc,h, she
would be required to produce output y ≥ ysc,h to avoid reward adjustment.
8Such a pooling contract is presented in the Appendix.
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can be compared to Fig. 5 in Murphy (1999) (reproduced as Fig. 4 at the beginning of the
Appendix). He finds that almost all companies have explicit annual bonus plans based on
single-year performances with some covering only CEOs, while others include all employees.
The typical plan pays a bonus (in percentage terms) conditional on a threshold performance
and specifies a maximum bonus. In the incentive mechanism we have considered, although there
is no exact parallel of bonus, for high target projection the marginal incentive at the interim
stage is at its maximum between output level (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ and the target output y¯ as the agent
is the residual claimant.
The empirical findings of Murphy (1999) suggest that bonus contracts are primarily aimed at
inducing agents towards better performance at the interim stage, i.e., solving the moral hazard
problem. Our task involves an extra challenge: not only must the agent be incentivized to exert
effort at the interim stage, resources must also be allocated correctly at the ex-ante stage. We
have, therefore, chosen the specific incentives in (7), and later on in (14) in section 4, after
incorporating the insights from the earlier theoretical literature (e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1986)
and McAfee and McMillan (1986)), to evaluate the mechanisms’ performance in mitigating
information asymmetry problems at both the ex-ante stage (about project type) and the interim
stage (about project type and efforts). Simultaneously, the mechanism’s reward adjustment for
underperformance is kept within reasonable bounds.
Analysis of target contract. Incentive compatibility under the target contract (7) requires:
U`(yˆ < ysc,h) ≥ U`(yˆ ≥ ysc,h) and Uh(yˆ ≥ ysc,h) ≥ Uh(yˆ < ysc,h). That is, the low-type should
be better off to announce a target below the threshold, while the high-type should be better off
by announcing a target at least ysc,h.
Assuming that the agent has zero outside option, both types must find it optimal to partic-
ipate (ex-ante individual rationality constraint):
U`(yˆ < ysc,h) ≥ 0, Uh(yˆ ≥ ysc,h) ≥ 0.
If an agent of type τ announces a target yˆ < ysc,h, she is provided with the resources
ω = ωsc,` and her problem is:
max
e
δsc(ωsc,`)
ηατe− 1
2
e2,
which yields the equilibrium effort: e∗τ = δsc(ωsc,`)ηατ , τ = `, h.
If an agent of type τ announces a target yˆ ≥ ysc,h, she is provided with resources ω = ωsc,h.
Her problem is then whether to produce at least ysc,h and not incur the downward reward
adjustment for underperformance, or produce less than ysc,h and receive the lower compensation.
Our first claim is that a high-type agent would announce a target at least ysc,h and deliver
ysc,h. Note that, having announced yˆ ≥ ysc,h, a high-type agent will not underperform: by
putting in her optimal effort eh = δsc(ωsc,h)
ηαh (as given in (3)) and, thus, producing ysc,h,
the agent receives a strictly higher (net) utility than if she had put in a lower effort with the
same resource support, ωsc,h, under the optimal share contract (of section 2) but without the
provision of reward adjustment for underperformance specified in (7). So, under the target
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contract, (7), to exert lower effort than the optimal share contract effort, eh = δsc(ωsc,h)
ηαh,
and incur the additional cost of downward reward adjustment (i.e., a lower share of output) can
only further lower the agent’s net utility (as her compensation function under (7) is otherwise
the same as in the optimal share contract), which cannot be optimal. It is easy to check
that the agent will not produce higher than ysc,h. It now remains to show that the high-
type agent will not project yˆ < ysc,h. By projecting yˆ < ysc,h, the high-type agent would
receive Uh(yˆ < ysc,h) = (1/2)δ
2
sc(ωsc,`)
2ηα2h, whereas Uh(yˆ ≥ ysc,h) = (1/2)δ2sc(ωsc,h)2ηα2h. Since
ωsc,h > ωsc,`, projecting yˆ ≥ ysc,h strictly dominates.
As for the low-type agent’s incentives, either she projects as low type (i.e., yˆ < ysc,h) and
receives a strictly positive payoff (as in the optimal share contract) or projects as high type
(i.e., yˆ ≥ ysc,h). In the latter case, suppose she exerts effort, e´, that leads to an output less
than ysc,h.
9 Then, there are two possibilities: (i) the agent’s compensation is adjusted such
that she forgoes all her salary income due to the reward adjustment, and (ii) the agent’s post-
adjustment share still leaves her with a strictly positive payoff. In case (i), the agent receives
zero payoff and this is clearly dominated by the strategy of truthful target projection as the low
type, i.e., the self-selection constraint rules out this outcome. In case (ii), the principal receives
(1−δsc)ysc,h−ωsc,h which is higher than her optimal share contract payoff, (1−δsc)ysc,`−ωsc,`, for
the `-type agent. Thus, for the principal, the implemented outcome under the target contract,
(7), is at least as good as the outcome under the optimal share contract (with known types),
and possibly better.10
The main message of our argument in this section can now be formally stated:
Proposition 1 (Optimal share contract implementation using targets). A menu of
piece-wise linear contracts, specified by (7), specifying target outputs is able to implement
resource allocation and efforts that are at least as good as those in the optimal share contract
(with known types). The target contract has the following features:
(i) for target announcement yˆ < ysc,h, optimal resource for the low-type agent, ωsc,`, is awarded
along with low-powered incentives – the agent receives a fixed share, δsc, of output;
(ii) for target announcement yˆ ≥ ysc,h, more generous, optimal resource for the high-type
agent, ωsc,h, is awarded along with high-powered incentives – the agent receives a fixed
share, δsc, of output if she meets the target; if there is a shortfall from the projection, her
compensation is lowered proportional to the shortfall in actual output from the projection.
Remark 1. The agent’s effort cost in the first-best case is half the output, which implies equal
shares for the principal and the agent. This is similar to the share implemented by the target
contract.
9If the agent produces ysc,h or more, the principal gains relative to the optimal share contract.
10It is worth pointing out how the target contract, (7), might even achieve strictly more than the optimal share
contract payoff for the principal. While the target contract is (piece-wise) linear in output, the reward adjustment
scheme (which makes the agent residual claimant) adds a negative component to the agent’s compensation (which
is a fraction of the projected target) by which the principal can dip into part of the (first-best) surplus that may
have been lost due to our restriction to share contract solution as the implementation objective.
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Due to unknown agent types, the principal may not be able to channel key resources com-
mensurate with agent types. Asking the agent to choose from a menu of target based contracts
that adjust the agent’s share for not being able to meet her chosen threshold target level resolves
the adverse selection problem. What should be of interest is the effectiveness of the proportion-
ate reward adjustment scheme. Our mechanism prescribes only occasional (downward) reward
adjustment in the form of lower output share and no bonus; further, when the reward is ad-
justed, it is proportional to the extent of underperformance. The mechanism can be contrasted
with the unrestricted second-best contract (which we present next) and Zou (1992) where the
optimal threat-based incentive mechanism employs a lump-sum penalty that is independent of
the degree of shortfall in output – see section 4.1 of Zou’s paper.
Unrestricted second-best contract. Suppose the principal offers a menu of contracts,
{ωτ , yτ , Rτ}τ∈{`,h} contingent on the type, τ , reported by the agent; that is, the agent is given
resources ωτ , has to produce output yτ and her compensation is Rτ . Denote the unrestricted
second-best contract solutions using the subscript ur.sb.
Proposition 2. The unrestricted second-best contract has the following features:
(i) the first-best outcome cannot be achieved;
(ii) the type-contingent resource allocations are:
ωur.sb,h = (ηα
2
h)
1
1−2η = ωfb,h, and ωur.sb,` = (γηα
2
` )
1
1−2η < ωfb,`, γ ≡ 1− p
1− pα2`
α2h
< 1;
(iii) the output produced by each type are:
yur.sb,h = (αhη
η)
2
1−2η = yfb,h, and yur.sb,` = γ
1
1−2η (α`η
η)
2
1−2η < yfb,`;
(iv) the agents’ efforts are:
eur.sb,h = (αhη
η)
1
1−2η = efb,h, and eur.sb,` = γ
1−η
1−2η (α`η
η)
1
1−2η < efb,`;
(v) the agents’ compensations are:
Rur.sb,h =
1
2
(
yur.sb,h
ωηur.sb,hαh
)2
+
1
2
(
yur.sb,`
ωηur.sb,`α`
)2
− 1
2
(
yur.sb,`
ωηur.sb,`αh
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
high-type’s information rent > 0
, and Rur.sb,` =
1
2
(
yur.sb,`
ωηur.sb,`α`
)2
.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. Under the unrestricted second-best contract, the
low-type agent is compensated her effort cost, while the high-type receives an additional in-
formation rent. The high-type agent is provided the first-best resources, incentivized to exert
her first-best effort (although at a higher cost to the principal), and produce the first-best
output. The low-type agent’s resource support, effort and output are lower than those in the
first-best case. Numerical comparisons presented in the Appendix show that the optimal share
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Fig. 2a: Agent’s remuneration with high target projection 
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Fig. 2b: Principal’s remuneration when agent projects high target 
contract, as expected, results in a welfare loss for the principal as compared to the unrestricted
second-best contract.
Although we focus on implementation of the optimal share contract for reasons discussed in
section 1, the target mechanism can also be used to implement the second-best contract:
Remark 2 (Second-best contract implementation using target mechanism). Suppose
the principal requires the agent to announce a target output, yˆ ∈ {yur.sb,`, yur.sb,h}. Then,
resources are allocated and agent remuneration determined as follows:
If yˆ = yur.sb,` : ω = ωur.sb,`, R =
Rur.sb,` if y ≥ yur.sb,`0 if y < yur.sb,`
If yˆ = yur.sb,h : ω = ωur.sb,h, R =
Rur.sb,h if y ≥ yur.sb,h0 if y < yur.sb,h
where y is the realized output, while ωur.sb,τ , yur.sb,τ and Rur.sb,τ are the resources, output and
remuneration for τ -type agent under the optimal contract. This target contract is able to imple-
ment the unrestricted second-best contract outcomes of Proposition 2.
The unrestricted second-best contract is represented in Figs. 2a-b. The agent’s compensa-
tion is lowered to zero if she misses the prescribed output, something we rarely see in practice.
This is also evident if we compare Fig. 2a to Fig. 5 in Murphy (1999) which depicts contracts
used in practice (reproduced at the beginning of the Appendix). Note that the horizontal seg-
ment in Murphy prior to the threshold performance is the bonus, not total compensation (as in
11
Fig. 2a). Further, as discussed in section 1, it is well known that optimal contracts predicted by
theory are seldom used in firms. Hence, in the rest of the paper, we mainly focus on the target
contract of the form in (7), with proportionate reward adjustment for two reasons – practical
relevance and wide applicability.
5 Stochastic output and the role of targets
We now extend our analysis to the case of production uncertainty; output is now subject to a
random shock, :
y = ωηατe+ , with η ∈ (0, 1
2
), (8)
where  has a continuously differentiable distribution, F (), with density f() > 0 on the support
[0, +], and F (0) = 0; F (.) is common knowledge and E() = ¯, where E is the expectation
operator.11
At this stage we would like to emphasize that we will be considering technologies with small
random shocks, that is, ¯ not too large. If there is a large element of chance (as would be the
case with high ¯), then screening the employee’s type or motivating her to work hard using
incentive schemes involving only small proportionate reward adjustment becomes difficult; a
low-skilled employee may project high performance and take calculated risks since, on average,
the random component of output would be high. So our analysis mostly focuses on small errors.
When the agent’s effort is unobservable but her type is known to the principal, i.e., there is
moral hazard but no adverse selection problem, for any share contract incentive (i.e., δ) set by
the principal, the agent’s problem is:
max
e≥0
U = E [δ (ωηατe+ )]− 1
2
e2,
which yields optimal effort as:
e˜(ω, δ) = δωηατ , τ = `, h. (9)
The principal’s problem can then be written as:
max
ω,δ
V = E
[
δ(1− δ)α2τω2η + (1− δ)− ω
]
,
where we use the agent’s optimal efforts from (9). Solving the first-order conditions,
∂V
∂ω
= 2ηδ(1− δ)α2τω2η−1 − 1 = 0, (10)
∂V
∂δ
= (1− 2δ)α2τω2η − ¯ = 0, (11)
yields the resources and shares under the optimal share contract with known types; we denote
these as (ω˜sc,τ , δ˜sc,τ ) (distinct from (ωsc,τ , δsc) in the deterministic case). That the solutions
11We choose a positive support for the random component of output; negative  implies output will be negative
if the agent chooses zero effort.
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(ω˜sc,τ , δ˜sc,τ ) exist and are interior (so that first-order conditions are appropriate) follow from
the fact that V is continuous in (ω, δ), both δ and ω are chosen from compact sets (these
together guaranteeing the principal’s problem has a solution, by Weierstrass theorem),12 and
neither δ = 0 or δ = 1 can be a solution, nor can ω = 0 or ω very large be the solution, for any
agent type, τ . In the Appendix, we provide details regarding the verification of second-order
conditions.
Using the solutions in (9), determine the optimal effort levels:
e˜sc,τ = δ˜sc,τ ω˜
η
sc,τατ , τ = `, h. (12)
Also, denote the deterministic component of output under the optimal share contract as:
y˜sc,τ = ω˜
η
sc,τατ e˜sc,τ , τ = `, h. (13)
Proposition 3 (Monotonicity of optimal share contract solution with stochastic out-
put). When agent types are known, the optimal share contract solutions ω˜sc,τ and δ˜sc,τ
(i) are increasing in ατ ;
(ii) approach, respectively, the optimal share contract solutions in the non-stochastic environ-
ment, ωsc,τ and δsc = 1/2 (given by (4) and (5)), as ¯→ 0.
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. The optimal share contract, thus, offers higher initial
resources and higher output share for the high-type agent. Next, we propose a target contract
to deal with adverse selection and resource allocation problems under production uncertainty.
Target contract under uncertainty. Consider a target contract of the following form:
If yˆ < y¯ : ω = ω˜sc,`, R = δ˜sc,` y ;
If yˆ ≥ y¯ : ω = ω˜sc,h, R =

δ˜sc,h y if y ≥ y¯ ,
δ˜sc,h y −min{(1− δ˜sc,h)[y¯ − y], δ˜sc,hy}︸ ︷︷ ︸
reward adjustment
if y < y¯ ;
(14)
where y¯ is the cut-off target set by the principal. ||
Remark 3. Note that for only two types of agents (as in our setup), a single cutoff target, y¯,
is intended to separate between who gets more generous support and who gets moderate support.
For more than two types, the target contract can be made further staggered by awarding smaller
and smaller resources for lower announced targets corresponding to low-valued τ ’s.
Also, note that, different from the target contract in (7) for the deterministic case, now
the linear incentive, δ, depends on the agent’s type (δ˜sc,τ as opposed to δsc). This additional
flexibility is brought in to motivate the different agent types to self-select the contract meant
12Clearly ω cannot be unbounded, so compactness assumption is reasonable.
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for her type. The higher the cut-off target, y¯, the more difficult it becomes for either type to
project the cut-off target.
Remark 4. In general, one would expect that the principal’s share would be increasing in the
resources she provides. However, to overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
the principal has to accept a lower share of output when she provides a higher resource support
to the agent. This is the high-type agent’s information rent.
We now turn to an analysis of the agent’s incentives and the following lemma, proved in the
Appendix, establishes the agent’s effort choice following a high target announcement.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium effort following high target announcement). Suppose y¯ ≥ y˜sc,h,
and the agent has announced the cut-off target y¯ to receive the more generous resource support.
Then the equilibrium efforts, e∗τ,h, τ = `, h, solving
e∗τ,h = ω˜
η
sc,hατ
[
δ˜sc,h + (1− δ˜sc,h)F (y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe∗τ,h)− F
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe∗τ,h
)]
, (15)
always exist. Moreover,
(i) the equilibrium effort for each type is such that the deterministic part of output, ω˜ηsc,hατe
∗
τ,h,
is strictly less than the cut-off target, y¯, when y¯ > y˜sc,h;
(ii) if y¯ = y˜sc,h, the high-type agent always meets the target (irrespective of the realization of
) while the low-type agent may sometimes fail to meet the target.
We can now present the first of three results for the uncertain output case.
Proposition 4 (High-type’s self-selection under the target contract). Suppose the prin-
cipal sets the cut-off target y¯ = y˜sc,h and offers the target contract (14). The high-type agent
self-selects by announcing a target yˆ = y˜sc,h, exerts the optimal share contract effort level, e˜sc,h,
and always achieves the target.
The proof (in the Appendix) follows the same line of reasoning as the arguments behind
Proposition 1. While, for the target contract (14), the high-type agent self-selects and achieves
the optimal share contract output level, the low-type agent’s self-selection cannot always be
guaranteed. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. If the random error term, ,
is large on average (relative to the deterministic part of the optimal share contract output for
the high type), a low-type agent may take a chance on being lucky with the random error
draw and announce a high target to take advantage of the more generous resource support
and higher share of the output (recall, by Proposition 3, ω˜sc,h > ω˜sc,` and δ˜sc,h > δ˜sc,`). As
discussed earlier, there is a realistic prospect of making the target incentive contract deliver the
desired separation of types at no (or insignificant) loss of efficiency as compared to the optimal
share contract if the random error component is not too large. Further, as ¯ → 0, the target
contract under uncertainty becomes equivalent to target incentives without uncertainty. Hence,
straightforward application of Propositions 1 and 3 yields:
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Proposition 5 (Limit result under uncertainty). Suppose the principal sets the cut-off
target y¯ = y˜sc,h and offers the target contract (14). In the limit, as ¯ → 0, the target contract
under uncertainty, (14), becomes equivalent to the target contract in the deterministic case, (7),
i.e., δ˜sc,τ → δsc = 12 and ω˜sc,τ → ωsc,τ . Furthermore, the target contract is able to achieve an
outcome at least as good as that in the optimal share contract.
Remark 5. Note that, by continuity, for sufficiently small , the target contract can implement
the optimal share contract outcome under uncertainty.
Next, to demonstrate further the potential of the target contract, we allow more flexibility
with regard to the reward adjustment scheme, whilst staying in the domain of (piece-wise)
linear contracts. We modify the contract as follows: if output falls below the threshold target
of y¯ = y˜sc,h, the agent who announced the high target will receive only a fixed non-negative
payment; otherwise her remuneration is the same as in the originally specified contract, (14).
Also, we simplify by assuming that the random error, , is distributed uniformly over [0, +].
The modification comes at a cost, however, as the reward adjustment is no longer proportionate.
Formally:
Target contract with discrete reward adjustment. Consider the following modifica-
tion to the original target contract (specified in (14)):
If yˆ < y¯ : ω = ω˜sc,`, R = δ˜sc,` y ;
If yˆ ≥ y¯ : ω = ω˜sc,h, R =
δ˜sc,h y if y ≥ y¯ ,γ y if y < y¯ ; (16)
where y¯ is the cut-off target set by the principal and γ < δ˜sc,h. ||
The contract (16), depicted in Figs. 3a-b (for the special case of γ = 0), may be contrasted
with Figs. 1a-b representing our original target incentive contract. Note that, despite the
discrete nature of reward adjustment, this variation of target incentives satisfies limited liability,
and, thus, may be considered reasonable.
Proposition 6 (Optimal share contract implementation with discrete reward ad-
justment). Suppose the principal offers the agent the target contract as specified in (16), sets
y¯ = y˜sc,h, and γ → 0. Furthermore, assume that the random error, , follows a ‘uniform’
distribution and
+ < min
{
y˜sc,` ,
α2`
(α2h − α2` )
y˜sc,h
}
. (17)
Then,
(i) the high-type agent self-selects by announcing a high target and achieves the target;
(ii) the low-type agent either self-selects by announcing a low target or announces a high target
and achieves the target;
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(iii) from the principal’s perspective, the target contract specified in (16) achieves an outcome
at least as good as the optimal share contract.
Thus, for underperformance, making the reward adjustment discrete (as opposed to the
earlier proportionate adjustment scheme), by significantly lowering the agent’s share if she fails
to produce her projected target, makes the target incentive contract more potent in screening
agent types. This is true for errors that, on average, are bounded away from zero, so long as
the average error is not too large relative to the output.
Propositions 5 and 6 confirm the merits of an important type of penalty mechanism13 – the
principle of lowering the agent’s compensation for underperformance relative to her projected
(or expected) level of performance. We show that small and proportionate adjustments (in the
agent’s compensation) based on targets can be useful for optimally awarding valuable scarce
resources to agents who propose projects of uncertain quality. The earlier literature has not
considered the resource allocation problem, which is important in many settings. Our analysis,
thus, offers a further perspective on target incentives by looking at resource allocation as an
explicit consideration for the principal.
13In a sense whether one uses the term penalty in describing our incentive mechanism, depends on what one
considers to be the agent’s rightful remuneration. Since the agent’s share is prescribed in the contract to be low
for below-target performance, one need not view this to be a penalty contract – just that the share is not as
generous as it might have been if output had met the projected target.
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6 Concluding remarks
Lack of accountability is often cited as one of the main reasons for non-delivery of performance
in organizations. To make someone accountable means the person will have to bear the conse-
quences of her actions. There are various ways incentives can be structured to make employees
accountable. One common practice is that employees are required to make performance projec-
tions, i.e., announce targets, before being given the required resources to achieve the projected
targets. To avoid exaggeration and wasteful spending of key resources, an employer may stipu-
late compensation adjustment clauses for non-delivery of the projected performance. This paper
argues that for reward adjustments linear in the shortfall of the actual performance below the
announced targets, i.e., adjustments that are “small” for “small underperformance”, exaggera-
tion of deliverables can be mitigated. This ensures that employees make realistic performance
projections and organizations are thus able to better channel valuable resources according to
each project’s merit. Such contracts would be considered fair as compared to contracts that
lower agent compensation significantly (possibly to zero) even for a small shortfall in output; the
latter are seldom observed in practice (see, among others, Murphy (1999), Prendergast (1999),
Charness (2004) and Fehr et al. (2007)).
17
Appendix
Components of a “typical” annual incentive plan 
 
Fig 4: Reproduction of Figure 5 in Murphy (1999), p. 2499 
Proof of Lemma 1. The first-best resource and effort allocations are given by the solution to:
max
ω,e≥0
W = ωηατe− 1
2
e2 − ω.
Thus, the first-best resource and effort allocations, contingent on the agent’s type, are:
ωfb,τ =
(
ηα2τ
) 1
1−2η , and efb,τ = (ατη
η)
1
1−2η ,
where the subscript fb refers to first-best. The first-best output level is yfb,τ = (ατη
η)
2
1−2η .
The principal’s surplus for each type is Vfb,τ = (
1
2 − η)(ατηη)(
2
1−2η ). Q.E.D.
Pooling share contract. When the agent’s type is unknown, consider the share contract
under both moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Given resources, ω, and a linear
contract as specified in (2), the agent solves: maxe≥0 U = δωηατe − 12e2, which gives the
agent’s effort:14 eτ = δω
ηατ , τ = `, h.
Using eτ from above, the principal’s problem can be written as: maxδ,ω Eα[V ] = Eα[δωηατe]−
ω = δ(1−δ)ω2ηEα[α2τ ]−ω, where Eα[.] denotes the expectations operator over the agent’s type.
The first-order conditions for the principal’s problem imply:15
δP =
1
2
, and ωP =
(
2ηδP (1− δP )Eα[α2τ ]
) 1
1−2η =
[η
2
(
pα2h + (1− p)α2`
)] 11−2η
, (18)
where the subscript P denotes the pooling contract. The main difference between the pooling
contract and the optimal share contract (implemented using the target mechanism) is in terms
14It is straightforward to check that ∂
2U
∂e2
= −1 < 0.
15The second-order conditions are satisfied: ∂
2Eα[V ]
∂ω2
= 2η(2η − 1)δ(1 − δ)ω2η−2Eα[α2τ ] < 0, if η ∈ (0, 12 );
∂2Eα[V ]
∂δ2
= −2ω2ηEα[α2τ ] < 0.
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of resources awarded to the agent – under the former, resources cannot be made contingent on
the agent’s type and this lack of flexibility means loss of surplus for the principal as compared
to the optimal share contract that the target mechanism implements.
Proof of Proposition 2. The principal offers a menu of contracts{(ω`, y`, R`), (ωh, yh, Rh)} to
induce self-selection by agents. If an agent reports type τ , she is given resource support ωτ and
compensated Rτ to produce output yτ . The optimal contract is given by the solution to:
max
{ωτ ,yτ ,Rτ}τ∈{`,h}
p(yh −Rh − ωh) + (1− p)(y` −R` − ω`), (19)
subject to
R` − 1
2
(
y`
ωη`α`
)2
≥ Rh − 1
2
(
yh
ωηhα`
)2
, (20)
Rh − 1
2
(
yh
ωηhαh
)2
≥ R` − 1
2
(
y`
ωη`αh
)2
, (21)
R` − 1
2
(
y`
ωη`α`
)2
≥ 0, (22)
Rh − 1
2
(
yh
ωηhαh
)2
≥ 0, (23)
where we have used the relation e = yωηα ; (20) and (21) are the incentive compatibility con-
straints for the low and high types, respectively. (22) and (23) are the individual rationality
constraints for the low and high types, respectively.
It is straightforward to check that the first-best solution does not satisfy the high-type’s
incentive compatibility constraint, (21). Under first-best solution, the LHS of (21) equals zero,
while the RHS is 12
(
yfb,`
wηfb,`
)2 (
1
α2`
− 1
α2h
)
> 0; hence, the first-best is not implementable.
Some straightforward but lengthy arguments show that, only the incentive compatibility
constraint for the high-type, (21), and the participation constraint for the low-type, (22), bind.
These binding constraints imply:
R` =
1
2
(
y`
ωη`α`
)2
, and Rh =
1
2
(
yh
ωηhαh
)2
+
1
2
(
y`
ωη`α`
)2
− 1
2
(
y`
ωη`αh
)2
.
Substituting R` and Rh in (19), write the principal’s problem as:
max
{ωτ ,yτ}τ∈{`,h}
p
[
yh − 1
2
(
yh
ωηhαh
)2
− 1
2
(
y`
ωη`α`
)2
+
1
2
(
y`
ωη`αh
)2
− ωh
]
+(1−p)
[
y` − 1
2
(
y`
ωη`α`
)2
− ω`
]
.
(24)
The first-order conditions with respect to yh and y` yield, respectively:
yh = (ω
η
hαh)
2, and y` = γ(ω
η
`α`)
2, (25)
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where γ ≡ 1−p
1−p α
2
`
α2
h
< 1. Using (25), the principal’s problem, (24), can be written as:
max
{ωτ}τ∈{`,h}
p
[
1
2
(
ωηhαh
)2
+
1
2
(
γωη`α
2
`
αh
)2
− ωh
]
+ (1− p)
[
γ
(
ωη`α`
)2 − ω`]− 1
2
γ2
(
ωη`α`
)2
.
The optimality conditions yield:
ωur.sb,h = (ηα
2
h)
1
1−2η = ωfb,h, and ωur.sb,` = (γηα
2
` )
1
1−2η < ωfb,`,
where the last relation follows since γ < 1 and the subscript ur.sb refers to the optimal contract
solution. Substituting ωur.sb,h and ωur.sb,` in (25) gives the prescribed output levels:
yur.sb,h = (αhη
η)
2
1−2η = yfb,h, and yur.sb,` = γ
1
1−2η (α`η
η)
2
1−2η < yfb,`.
The agents’ efforts under the optimal contract are (since eur.sb,τ =
yur.sb,τ
ωηur.sb,τατ
):
eur.sb,h = (αhη
η)
1
1−2η = efb,h, and eur.sb,` = γ
1−η
1−2η (α`η
η)
1
1−2η < efb,`. Q.E.D.
Comparison of optimal share contract and unrestricted second-best contract.
From the solution to the optimal share contract, (3) – (5), we have: δsc =
1
2 , ωsc,τ =
(
1
2
) 1
1−2η
(
ηα2τ
) 1
1−2η
and esc,τ =
(
1
2
) 1−η
1−2η (ηηατ )
1
1−2η . The principal’s surplus under the optimal share contract for
each type of agent is:
Vsc,τ =
1
4
(
1
2
ηα2τ
)( 2η
1−2η )
α2τ −
(
1
2
ηα2τ
)( 1
1−2η )
,
while, under the second-best contract, they are:
Vur.sb,h =
1
2
(ηηαh)
2
1−2η − 1
2
γ
2−2η
1−2η
(
1− α
2
`
α2h
)
(ηηα`)
2
1−2η − (ηα2h) 11−2η ,
and Vur.sb,` = γ
1
1−2η
(
1− γ
2
)
(ηηα`)
2
1−2η − (γηα2` )
1
1−2η .
Explicit comparison of the principal’s expected surplus under the different contracts is not
informative, so we compare the surpluses numerically. We assume the following parameters:16
αh = 1, α` = 0.75 and p = 0.4. Fig. 5 shows the expected surpluses under different contracts
for different values of η ∈ [0.05, 0.45]. As expected, the implemented optimal share contract
outcome is inferior to the optimal contract. 
Verification of the second-order conditions for the optimal share contract
solutions: Stochastic output case. In order to ensure that the solutions (ω˜sc,τ , δ˜sc,τ ) are
indeed maximizers, rather minimizers or saddle points, we need to check that the Hessian of
V is negative semi-definite (Theorem 17.8 of Simon and Blume (1994)). So in the following
16Other parameter specifications give similar results.
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derivations it is enough to show that the final expression will be non-negative, along with our
verification of negative signs of the first two expressions:
∂2V
∂ω2
= 2η(2η − 1)δ(1− δ)α2τω2η−2 < 0, (since η < 1/2)
∂2V
∂δ2
= −2α2τω2η < 0,
∂2V
∂ω2
∂2V
∂δ2
− ( ∂2V
∂ω∂δ
)2
= 4ηα4τω
4η−2 [− (2η − 1)δ(1− δ)− η(1− 2δ)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
sign ?
.
The last expression is non-negative if and only if
δ(1− δ) ≥ 1
2 + (1/η)
. (26)
It is easy to see from (10) and (11) that δ˜sc,τ ∈ (0, 1/2). Also, δ(1− δ)− 12+(1/η) > 0 at δ = 1/2
for η < 1/2, so condition (26) is satisfied. Further, δ(1− δ) is strictly increasing in δ ∈ [0, 1/2),
and given that at δ = 0 condition (26) is violated, there must be some critical δ¯ ∈ (0, 1/2) such
that condition (26) will hold for all δ ∈ [δ¯, 1/2] and will be violated for δ < δ¯. One can conclude
therefore the optimal share contract, δsc,τ , must lie somewhere in the interval [δ¯, 1/2). (It should
be noted that the difficulty of verifying the non-negativity condition (26) using the first-order
conditions is that the solutions are not explicit. But since the principal’s maximization problem
will have solutions that are interior, the second-order conditions, in particular condition (26),
must be satisfied.) 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) First we claim that if
∂ω˜sc,τ
∂ατ
≤ 0 then it must be that ∂δ˜sc,τ∂ατ < 0. To
see this, go back to (10). As ατ increases and so ω˜sc,τ decreases (or stays unchanged), α
2
τ ω˜
2η−1
sc,τ
would increase (because η < 1/2). Hence to satisfy (10), it must be that δ˜sc,τ (1 − δ˜sc,τ ) must
decrease, i.e., (1− 2δ˜sc,τ )∂δ˜sc,τ∂ατ < 0, i.e.,
∂δ˜sc,τ
∂ατ
< 0 (from (11), (1− 2δ˜sc,τ ) > 0).
Next we claim that ω˜sc,h > ω˜sc,`. Suppose not, so that ω˜sc,h ≤ ω˜sc,` (recall, αh > α`).
Then by the above argument, δ˜sc,h < δ˜sc,`. By the definition of the optimal share contract, the
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principal’s payoff by offering h type’s (` type’s) incentives when the employee is actually of h
type (` type) must be weakly greater than the payoff if he offers ` type’s (h type’s) incentives:
δ˜sc,h(1− δ˜sc,h)α2hω˜2ηsc,h + (1− δ˜sc,h)¯− ω˜sc,h ≥ δ˜sc,`(1− δ˜sc,`)α2hω˜2ηsc,` + (1− δ˜sc,`)¯− ω˜sc,`, (27)
δ˜sc,`(1− δ˜sc,`)α2` ω˜2ηsc,` + (1− δ˜sc,`)¯− ω˜sc,` ≥ δ˜sc,h(1− δ˜sc,h)α2` ω˜2ηsc,h + (1− δ˜sc,h)¯− ω˜sc,h. (28)
Rewrite (27) and (28), respectively, as follows:
δ˜sc,`(1− δ˜sc,`)α2hω˜2ηsc,` − δ˜sc,h(1− δ˜sc,h)α2hω˜2ηsc,h ≤ [(1− δ˜sc,h)¯− ω˜sc,h]− [(1− δ˜sc,`)¯− ω˜sc,`], (29)
δ˜sc,`(1− δ˜sc,`)α2` ω˜2ηsc,` − δ˜sc,h(1− δ˜sc,h)α2` ω˜2ηsc,h ≥ [(1− δ˜sc,h)¯− ω˜sc,h]− [(1− δ˜sc,`)¯− ω˜sc,`]. (30)
Clearly, (29) and (30) together yield a contradiction, given that αh > α`.
The argument just completed shows that ω˜sc,τ is (strictly) increasing in ατ . So, as ατ
increases, α2τ ω˜
2η
sc,τ would increase, and to satisfy (11) it must be that
∂δ˜sc,τ
∂ατ
> 0.
(ii) By setting ¯ = 0 in (11), it follows that δ˜sc,τ = 1/2 that, along with (10), imply that
ω˜sc,τ = ωsc,τ as in (4). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Agent’s self-selection according to types requires:
U`(yˆ < y¯) ≥ U`(yˆ ≥ y¯), Uh(yˆ ≥ y¯) ≥ Uh(yˆ < y¯),
where Uτ (.) is the expected utility of the type τ agent. It is easy to check that the (ex-ante)
individual rationality constraints will be fulfilled if the agent projects a target according to her
true type, for the incentive mechanism (14). Also, limited liability is satisfied.
Low target announcement and equilibrium effort choice. If an agent of type τ announces
a target yˆ < y¯, then she is provided with the resources, ω = ω˜sc,`, and she solves the following
problem:
max
e
E
[
δ˜sc,`
(
ω˜ηsc,`ατe+ 
)
− 1
2
e2
]
,
inducing her to exert the effort level,
e∗τ (yˆ < y¯) = δ˜sc,` ω˜
η
sc,` ατ , τ = `, h.
The low-type agent, thus, exerts her optimal (share contract) effort: e∗` (yˆ < y¯) = e˜sc,`.
Accordingly, the expected utility of agent type τ is
Uτ (yˆ < y¯) =
1
2
δ˜2sc,` ω˜
2η
sc,` α
2
τ + δ˜sc,` ¯.
High target announcement and equilibrium effort choice. Now consider an agent of
type τ who announces a target yˆ ≥ y¯ and is given the resources, ω = ω˜sc,h; so her ex-post
payoff, given any effort level e, is{
δ˜sc,hy −min{(1− δ˜sc,h)[y¯ − y], δ˜sc,hy} − 12e2, if y < y¯
δ˜sc,hy − 12e2, if y ≥ y¯,
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that is, 
−12e2, if y ≤ (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯
y − (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − 12e2, if (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ ≤ y < y¯
δ˜sc,hy − 12e2, if y ≥ y¯.
Different ranges of y correspond to appropriate ranges of .17 For instance, (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ < y < y¯
if (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ < ω˜ηsc,hατe+  < y¯ ⇔ (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe <  < y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe, the probability
of which is F (y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)− F ((1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe).
The agent thus solves the following problem:
max
e
Uτ (e|yˆ ≥ y¯) :=
∫ y¯−ω˜ηsc,hατ e
(1−δ˜sc,h)y¯−ω˜ηsc,hατ e
{
[ω˜ηsc,hατe+ ]− (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯
}
f()d
+
∫ +
y¯−ω˜ηsc,hατ e
{
δ˜sc,h[ω˜
η
sc,hατe+ ]
}
f()d − 1
2
e2. (31)
Differentiate Uτ (e|yˆ ≥ y¯) w.r.t. e, denote it by ψ(e), and set it equal to zero:
ψ(e) =
[
ω˜ηsc,hατe+ y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe− (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯
]
f(y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)[−ω˜ηsc,hατ ]
−
[
ω˜ηsc,hατe+ (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe− (1− δ˜sc,h)y¯
]
f
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe
)
[−ω˜ηsc,hατ ]
+
∫ y¯−ω˜ηsc,hατ e
(1−δ˜sc,h)y¯−ω˜ηsc,hατ e
{
ω˜ηsc,hατ
}
f()d+
[
δ˜sc,h(ω˜
η
sc,hατe+ 
+)
]
.f(+).0
−
[
δ˜sc,h(ω˜
η
sc,hατe+ y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)
]
f(y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)[−ω˜ηsc,hατ ]
+
∫ +
y¯−ω˜ηsc,hατ e
{
δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,hατ
}
f()d()− e
= ω˜ηsc,hατ
[
F (y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)− F
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe
)]
+δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,hατ
[
1− F (y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)
]
− e
= ω˜ηsc,hατ
[
δ˜sc,h + (1− δ˜sc,h)F (y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe)− F
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe
)]
− e = 0, (32)
to solve for the agent’s equilibrium effort level, (15), repeated here for convenience:
e∗τ,h = ω˜
η
sc,hατ
[
δ˜sc,h + (1− δ˜sc,h)F (y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe∗τ,h)− F
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατe∗τ,h
)]
.
The function ψ(e), given by (32), is continuous in e. For any y¯ ≥ y˜sc,h, let eˆτ be such that
ω˜ηsc,hατ eˆτ = y¯, (33)
where y˜sc,h is as defined in (13).
Verify that
ψ(0) = ω˜ηsc,hατ
[
δ˜sc,h(1− F (y¯)) + F (y¯)− F
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯
)]
> 0,
17Note that for y ≤ (1 − δ˜sc,h)y¯, the limited liability constraint is satisfied as the principal gives zero (not
negative) remuneration to the agent.
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and ψ(eˆτ ) = ω˜
η
sc,hατ
[
δ˜sc,h + (1− δ˜sc,h)F (0)− F
(
(1− δ˜sc,h)y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hατ eˆτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
)]− eˆτ
= ω˜ηsc,hατ δ˜sc,h − eˆτ
≤ e˜sc,h
αh
ατ − e˜sc,hαh
ατ
((33) and y¯ ≥ y˜sc,h imply eˆτ ≥ αhe˜sc,h
ατ
; also use (12))
≤ 0.
So, by the intermediate-value theorem there exists 0 < e∗τ,h ≤ eˆτ , τ = `, h, such that ψ(e∗τ,h) = 0;
these are the optimal efforts satisfying (15).
Further, for y¯ > y˜sc,h, it must be that ψ(eˆτ ) < 0 so that e
∗
τ,h < eˆτ , i.e., the deterministic
part of output ω˜ηsc,hατe
∗
τ,h < y¯.
If y¯ = y˜sc,h then eˆh = e˜sc,h and ψ(e˜sc,h) = 0 so that e
∗
h,h = e˜sc,h and the high-type agent’s
deterministic output exactly equals the target. However, the low-type agent may fail to meet
the proclaimed high target, as ψ(eˆ`) < 0 and therefore e
∗
`,h < eˆ`. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. If the high-type agent announces a high target, yˆ = y˜sc,h, and puts
in the optimal share contract effort, e˜sc,h = δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,hαh, she meets the target even with the
lowest realization of the random shock, i.e., with  = 0.18 Her payoff then equals Uh(yˆ =
y˜sc,h) =
1
2 δ˜
2
sc,hω˜
2η
sc,hα
2
h + δ˜sc,h¯. However, her maximal payoff from announcing a low target
is Uh(yˆ < y˜sc,h) =
1
2 δ˜
2
sc,`ω˜
2η
sc,`α
2
h + δ˜sc,`¯, which is strictly less than Uh(yˆ = y˜sc,h). Thus, the
high-type agent would self-select by announcing yˆ = y˜sc,h.
Also, by Lemma 2, the high-type agent will put in the optimal share contract effort level,
e˜sc,h, and always achieve the target. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider (16). For y¯ = y˜sc,h, it is straightforward to verify that the high-
type agent would self-select by announcing a high target, yˆ = y˜sc,h, put in an effort corresponding
to the optimal share contract, e˜sc,h, and always achieve the target; this follows from the fact
that the contract (16) has higher downward reward adjustment for underperformance than the
contract (14), and under the latter contract the high-type agent chose to self-select and put in
the optimal share contract effort (by Proposition 4).
Suppose now the low-type agent projects yˆ = y˜sc,h and is given the high-type’s resource,
ω˜sc,h. Define e
c as the critical effort that she needs to exert to produce, without fail, her
announced target: ω˜ηsc,hα`e
c = y˜sc,h. It can be easily verified that
ec = δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,h
α2h
α`
. (34)
If the low-type agent puts in an effort of at least ec, her expected utility is
U`(e ≥ ec) = δ˜sc,hω˜ηsc,hα`e+ δ˜sc,h¯−
1
2
e2.
18Note that if the principal sets the cut-off target y¯ = y˜sc,h, any agent who wants to announce a high target
will announce yˆ = y¯ = y˜sc,h as there is no additional benefit from announcing a target higher than the cut-off
target.
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Furthermore,
∂U`(e > e
c)
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e↓ec
= δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,h
[
(α2` − α2h)
α`
]
< 0,
so the low-type agent should never choose an effort level in excess of ec.
Suppose the low-type agent exerts an effort e < ec. Then her ex-post payoff is:{
δ˜sc,hy − 12e2, if y ≥ y¯
γy − 12e2, if y < y¯.
Note that y < y¯ ⇔ ω˜ηsc,hα`e +  < y¯ ⇔  < y¯ − ω˜ηsc,hα`e, so the probability that the low-type
agent falls short of the projected high target, yˆ = y˜sc,h,
19 is F (y˜sc,h − ω˜ηsc,hα`e). The low-type
agent, thus, solves:
max
e<ec
U`(e|yˆ = y˜sc,h) :=
∫ y˜sc,h−ω˜ηsc,hα`e
0
γyf()d+
∫ +
y˜sc,h−ω˜ηsc,hα`e
δ˜sc,hyf()d − 1
2
e2. (35)
Differentiating (35) w.r.t. e yields:
∂U`
∂e
= δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,hα`+ (δ˜sc,h−γ)ω˜ηsc,hα`
[
y˜sc,hf(y˜sc,h − ω˜ηsc,hα`e)− F (y˜sc,h − ω˜ηsc,hα`e)
]
− e. (36)
Now by letting γ → 0, (36) simplifies as follows:
∂U`
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e<ec
= δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,hα`
[
1− F (y˜sc,h − ω˜ηsc,hα`e) + y˜sc,hf(y˜sc,h − ω˜ηsc,hα`e)
]− e. (37)
And further,
∂U`
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e↑ec
= δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,h
α2` (1 + y˜sc,hf(0))− α2h
α`
. (38)
Let us now invoke the assumption that the error term, , follows a uniform distribution so
that f() = 1
+
, F () = 
+
and E() = +2 . Let us check the suitability of effort choice e < e
c.
Using (38), it can be verified that
∂U`
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e↑ec
=
δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,h
α`
[
α2`
y˜sc,h + 
+
+
− α2h
]
>︸︷︷︸
(by (17))
0.
So in the left-neighborhood of the critical effort ec, the low-type agent’s expected utility is
increasing in effort. We had earlier ruled out the possibility of low-type choosing an effort
exceeding ec. Thus, the critical effort ec is locally an equilibrium choice for the low-type agent
after projecting yˆ = y˜sc,h.
Next, we check whether any other effort level in [0, ec) could possibly constitute the low-type
agent’s equilibrium response. From (37), we have
∂U`
∂e
∣∣∣∣
e=0
= δ˜sc,hω˜
η
sc,hα`
[
1− F (y˜sc,h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ y˜sc,hf(y˜sc,h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]
> 0.
19Recall that any agent who wants to project a high target will announce yˆ = y¯ = y˜sc,h.
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Hence, it is not optimal for the low-type agent to put in effort e = 0. This is true irrespective
of any assumption on the error distribution (such as the ‘uniform’ distribution assumption).
The second-order condition for an interior solution is ∂
2U`
∂e2
∣∣∣∣
0<e<ec
=
δ˜sc,hω˜
2η
sc,hα
2
`
+
− 1 < 0,
i.e., δ˜sc,hω˜
2η
sc,hα
2
` < 
+, which is ruled out by condition (17) (because + < y˜sc,`). Hence, no
interior effort level in (0, ec) can be an equilibrium for the low-type agent.
Hence, the low-type agent either self-selects and announces a low target, yˆ < y˜sc,h, or if she
announces a high target, yˆ = y˜sc,h, she will surely achieve the projected high target. In either
case, from the principal’s perspective, the outcome is at least as good as the optimal share
contract outcome. Q.E.D.
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